RELLOSA v. GAW CHEE HUN

RELLOSA v. GAW CHEE HUN

G.R. No. L-1411. September 29, 1953

Ponente: J. Bautista Angelo

DOCTRINE:

The “In Pari Delicto” doctrine provides that the proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation.

FACTS:

On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same parties.

Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution.

The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of the sale

ISSUES:

1.    Whether the sale was void because it is against the constitution

2.  Whether the petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts

HELD:

1) Yes, the court held that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. This matter has been once more submitted to the court for deliberation, but the ruling was reaffirmed. This ruling fully disposes of the question touching on the validity of the sale of the property herein involved.

2) No, even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution to set aside the sale in question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law.