FILIPINAS LIFE v. PEDROSO

FILIPINAS LIFE v. PEDROSO

G.R. No. 159489; February 4, 2008

Ponente: J. Quisimbing

FACTS:
Respondent Teresita O. Pedroso is a policyholder of a 20-year endowment life insurance issued by petitioner Filipinas Life Assurance Company (Filipinas Life). Pedroso claims Renato Valle was her insurance agent since 1972 and Valle collected her monthly premiums. In the first week of January 1977, Valle told her that the Filipinas Life Escolta Office was holding a promotional investment program for policyholders. It was offering 8% prepaid interest a month for certain amounts deposited on a monthly basis. Enticed, she initially invested and issued a post-dated check dated January 7, 1977 for P10,000.  In return, Valle issued Pedroso his personal check for P800 for the 8% prepaid interest and an agents receipt.  

Subsequently, she called the Escolta office and talked to the branch manager, Angel Apetrior. Pedroso inquired about the promotional investment and Apetrior confirmed that there was such a promotion. She was even told she could "push through with the check" she issued. From the records, the check, with the endorsement of Alcantara at the back, was deposited in the account of Filipinas Life with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company (CBTC), Escolta Branch.

Pedroso waited for the maturity of her initial investment. A month after, her investment of P10,000 was returned to her after she made a written request for its refund. The formal written request, dated February 3, 1977, was written on an inter-office memorandum form of Filipinas Life prepared by Alcantara.  To collect the amount, Pedroso personally went to the Escolta branch where Alcantara gave her the P10,000 in cash. After a second investment, she made 7 to 8 more investments in varying amounts, totaling P37,000 but at a lower rate of 5%  prepaid interest a month. Upon maturity of Pedroso's subsequent investments, Valle would take back from Pedroso the corresponding yellow-colored agent's receipt he issued to the latter.

Pedroso told respondent Jennifer N. Palacio, also a Filipinas Life insurance policyholder, about the investment plan. Palacio made a total investment of P49,550  but at only 5% prepaid interest. However, when Pedroso tried to withdraw her investment, Valle did not want to return some P17,000 worth of it. Palacio also tried to withdraw hers, but Filipinas Life, despite demands, refused to return her money. With the assistance of their lawyer, they went to Filipinas Life Escolta Office to collect their respective investments, and to inquire why they had not seen Valle for quite some time. But their attempts were futile. Hence, respondents filed an action for the recovery of a sum of money. Filipinas Life contends that that the investment scheme offered to respondents by Valle, Apetrior and Alcantara was outside the scope of their authority as agents of Filipinas Life. 

ISSUE:
Whether the agents of Filipinas Life exceeded the scope of their authority

HELD:

No, the agents of Filipinas Life did not exceed the scope of their authority.


The Supreme Court ruled that the general rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of its agent done within the scope of its authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. When the agent exceeds his authority, the agent becomes personally liable for the damage.  But even when the agent exceeds his authority, the principal is still solidarily liable together with the agent if the principal allowed the agent to act as though the agent had full powers.  In other words, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the principal ratifies them, expressly or impliedly.  Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority. 
Filipinas Life cannot profess ignorance of Valle's acts. Even if Valle's representations were beyond his authority as a debit/insurance agent, Filipinas Life thru Alcantara and Apetrior expressly and knowingly ratified Valle's acts. It cannot even be denied that Filipinas Life benefited from the investments deposited by Valle in the account of Filipinas Life. In our considered view, Filipinas Life had clothed Valle with apparent authority; hence, it is now estopped to deny said authority. Innocent third persons should not be prejudiced if the principal failed to adopt the needed measures to prevent misrepresentation, much more so if the principal ratified his agent's acts beyond the latter's authority.

DOMINGO v. ROBLES

DOMINGO v. ROBLES

G.R. No. 153743; March 18, 2005

Ponente: J. Panganiban

FACTS:

The historical backdrop shows that [petitioner] and her husband, Valentino Domingo, were the registered owners of Lot 19, Block 1, subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-15706 located at Cristina Subdivision, Concepcion, Marikina. On this lot, [Petitioner] Norma B. Domingo discontinued the construction of her house allegedly for failure of her husband to send the necessary financial support. So, she decided to dispose of the property.

A friend, Flor Bacani, volunteered to act as [petitioner's] agent in selling the lot. Trusting Bacani, [petitioner] delivered their owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 to him (Bacani). Later, the title was said to have been lost. 

In the petition for its reconstitution, [petitioner] gave Bacani all her receipts of payment for real estate taxes. At the same time, Bacani asked [petitioner] to sign what she recalled was a record of exhibits. Thereafter, [petitioner] waited patiently but Bacani did not show up any more.

On November 1, 1994, [Petitioner] Norma Domingo visited the lot and was surprised to see the [respondents] (Robles, for short) starting to build a house on the subject lot. A verification with the Register of Deeds revealed that the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 had already been cancelled with the registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 signed by Norma B. Domingo and her husband Valentino Domingo, as sellers, and [Respondent] Yolanda Robles, for herself and representing the other minor [respondents], as buyers. As a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201730 was issued on June 10, 1991 in the name of [Respondent] Robles.

Claiming not to have met any of the [respondents] nor having signed any sale over the property in favor of anybody (her husband being abroad at the time), [petitioner] assumed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 is a forgery and, therefore, could not validly transfer ownership of the lot to the [respondents]. Hence, the case for the nullity thereof and its reconveyance.

[Respondents] Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and for value. They narrate that the subject lot was offered to them by Flor Bacani, as the agent of the owners; that after some time when they were already prepared to buy the lot, Bacani introduced to them the supposed owners and agreed on the sale; then, on May 9, 1991, Bacani and the introduced seller presented a Deed of Absolute Sale already signed by Valentino and Norma Domingo needing only her (Robles') signature. 

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value

HELD:

Yes, the respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value.

The Supreme Court ruled that the sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioner's agent, who had with him the original of the owner's duplicate Certificate of Title to the property, free from any liens or encumbrances. . Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, a presumption of good faith in their favor stands

The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioner's husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and received payment for the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the production of the owner's certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property. 

RURAL BANK OF MILAOR v. OCFEMIA

RURAL BANK OF MILAOR v. OCFEMIA

G.R. No. 137686; February 8, 2000

Ponente: J. Vitug

FACTS:

The evidence presented by the respondents through the testimony of Marife O. Niño, shows that she is the daughter of Francisca Ocfemia and the late Renato Ocfemia who died on July 23, 1994. The parents of her father, Renato Ocfemia, were Juanita Arellano Ocfemia and Felicisimo Ocfemia. 

Marife O. Niño knows the five (5) parcels of land which are located in Bombon, Camarines Sur and that they are the ones possessing them which were originally owned by her grandparents. During the lifetime of her grandparents, respondents mortgaged the said five (5) parcels of land and two (2) others to the Rural Bank of Milaor.

The spouses Felicisimo Ocfemia and Juanita Arellano Ocfemia were not able to redeem the mortgaged properties consisting of 7 parcels of land and so the mortgage was foreclosed and thereafter ownership thereof was transferred to the bank. Out of the 7 parcels that were foreclosed, 5 of them are in the possession of the respondents because these 5 parcels of land were sold by the bank to the parents of Marife O. Niño as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed in January 1988.

The aforementioned 5 parcels of land subject of the deed of sale, have not been, however transferred in the name of the parents of Merife O. Niño after they were sold to her parents by the bank because according to the Assessor's Office the five (5) parcels of land, subject of the sale, cannot be transferred in the name of the buyers as there is a need to have the document of sale registered with the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur.

In view of the foregoing, Marife O. Niño went to the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur with the Deed of Sale in order to have the same registered. The Register of Deeds, however, informed her that the document of sale cannot be registered without a board resolution of the Bank. Marife Niño then went to the bank, showed to it the Deed of Sale, the tax declaration and receipt of tax payments and requested the bank for a board resolution so that the property can be transferred to the name of Renato Ocfemia the husband of petitioner Francisca Ocfemia and the father of the other respondents having died already.

Despite several requests, the bank refused her request for a board resolution and made many alibis.  She was told that the bank had a new manager and it had no record of the sale. 


ISSUE:
Whether the board of directors of a rural banking corporation be compelled to confirm a deed of absolute sale of real property which deed of sale was executed by the bank manager without prior authority of the board of directors of the rural banking corporation

HELD:

Yes, the board of directors can be compelled to confirm a deed of absolute sale even though the bank manager executed such deed without prior authority from the banking corporation.

The Supreme Court ruled that the bank acknowledged, by its own acts or failure to act, the authority of the manager to enter into binding contracts. After the execution of the Deed of Sale, respondents occupied the properties in dispute and paid the real estate taxes due thereon. If the bank management believed that it had title to the property, it should have taken some measures to prevent the infringement or invasion of its title thereto and possession thereof.

In this light, the bank is estopped from questioning the authority of the bank manager to enter into the contract of sale. If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds the agent out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agent's authority.  

Unquestionably, petitioner has authorized Tena to enter into the Deed of Sale. Accordingly, it has a clear legal duty to issue the board resolution sought by respondents. Having authorized her to sell the property, it behooves the bank to confirm the Deed of Sale so that the buyers may enjoy its full use.

AIR FRANCE v. CA

AIR FRANCE v. CA

G.R. No. L-57339; December 29, 1983

Ponente: J. Melencio-Herera

FACTS:

Sometime in February, 1970, the late Jose G. Gana and his family, numbering nine (the GANAS), purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels, Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent, nine (9) "open-dated" air passage tickets for the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. The GANAS paid a total of US$2,528.85 for their economy and first class fares. Said tickets were bought at the then prevailing exchange rate of P3.90 per US$1.00. The GANAS also paid travel taxes of P100.00 for each passenger.

On 24 April 1970, AIR FRANCE exchanged or substituted the aforementioned tickets with other tickets for the same route. At this time, the GANAS were booked for the Manila/Osaka segment on AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for 8 May 1970, and for the Tokyo/Manila return trip on AIR FRANCE Flight 187 on 22 May 1970. The aforesaid tickets were valid until 8 May 1971.

The GANAS did not depart on 8 May 1970.

Sometime in January, 1971, Jose Gana sought the assistance of Teresita Manucdoc, for the extension of the validity of their tickets, which were due to expire on 8 May 1971. Teresita enlisted the help of Lee Ella. Ella sent the tickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of AIR FRANCE. The tickets were returned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible unless the fare differentials resulting from the increase in fares triggered by an increase of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Philippine peso and the increased travel tax were first paid. Ella then returned the tickets to Teresita and informed her of the impossibility of extension.

In the meantime, the GANAS had scheduled their departure on 7 May 1971 or one day before the expiry date. In the morning of the very day of their scheduled departure on the first leg of their trip, Teresita requested travel agent Ella to arrange the revalidation of the tickets. Ella gave the same negative answer and warned her that although the tickets could be used by the GANAS if they left on 7 May 1971, the tickets would no longer be valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then have expired on 8 May 1971. Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS to make the arrangements. 
With that assurance, Ella, on his own, attached to the tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, one a JAL sticker and the other an SAS (Scandinavian Airways System) sticker. The SAS sticker indicates thereon that it was "Revalidated by: the Philippine Travel Bureau, Branch No. 2" 
Notwithstanding the warnings, the GANAS departed from Manila in the afternoon of 7 May 1971 on board AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for Osaka, Japan. There is no question with respect to this leg of the trip.

However, for the Osaka/Tokyo flight on 17 May 1971, Japan Airlines refused to honor the tickets because of their expiration, and the GANAS had to purchase new tickets. They encountered the same difficulty with respect to their return trip to Manila as AIR FRANCE also refused to honor their tickets. They were able to return only after pre-payment in Manila, through their relatives, of the readjusted rates. They finally flew back to Manila on separate Air France Flights on 19 May 1971 for Jose Gana and 26 May 1971 for the rest of the family.

On 25 August 1971, the GANAS commenced before the then Court of First Instance of Manila for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage.

ISSUE:
Whether the GANAS have made out a case for breach of contract of carriage entitling them to an award of damages

HELD:

No, the GANAS are not entitled to an award for damages

The Supreme Court ruled that AIR FRANCE cannot be faulted for breach of contract when it dishonored the tickets of the GANAS after 8 May 1971 since those tickets expired on said date; nor when it required the GANAS to buy new tickets or have their tickets re-issued for the Tokyo/Manila segment of their trip. Neither can it be said that, when upon sale of the new tickets, it imposed additional charges representing fare differentials, it was motivated by self-interest or unjust enrichment.
It should be recalled that AIR FRANCE was even unaware of the validating SAS and JAL stickers that Ella had affixed spuriously. Consequently, Japan Air Lines and AIRFRANCE merely acted within their contractual rights when they dishonored the tickets on the remaining segments of the trip and when AIR FRANCE demanded payment of the adjusted fare rates and travel taxes for the Tokyo/Manila flight.

PNB v. IAC

PNB v. IAC

G.R. No. 75223; March 14, 1990

Ponente: J. Paras

FACTS:

On March 20, 1968, Leticia de la Vina-Sepe executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB, San Carlos Branch, over a lot registered in her name to secure the payment of a sugar crop loan of P3,400. 


Later, Leticia Sepe, acting as attorney-in-fact for her brother-in-law, private respondent Romeo Alcedo, executed an amended real estate mortgage to include his (Alcedo's) Lot No. 1626 as additional collateral for Sepe's increased loan of P16,500. Leticia Sepe and private respondent Alcedo verbally agreed to split fifty-fifty (50-50) the proceeds of the loan but failing to receive his one-half share from her, Alcedo wrote a letter on May 12,1970 to the PNB, San Carlos Branch, revoking the Special Power of Attorney which he had given to Leticia Sepe to mortgage his Lot No. 1626.

Replying on May 22, 1970, the PNB Branch Manager, Jose T. Gellegani, advised Alcedo that his land had already been included as collateral for Sepe's 1970-71 sugar crop loan, which the latter had already availed of, nevertheless, he assured Alcedo that the bank would exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe's forthcoming (1971-72) sugar crop loan 

On the same day, May 22, 1970, PNB advised Sepe in writing to replace Lot No. 1402 with another collateral of equal or higher value.

Despite the above advice from PNB, Sepe was still able to obtain an additional loan from PNB increasing her debt of P16,500 to P56,638.69 on the security of Alcedo's property as collateral. On January 15,1974, Alcedo received two (2) letters from PNB: (1) informing him of Sepe's failure to pay her loan in the total amount of P56,638.69; and (2) giving him six (6) days to settle Sepe's outstanding obligation, as otherwise, foreclosure proceedings would be commenced against his property. Alcedo requested Sepe to pay her accounts to forestall foreclosure proceedings against his property, but to no avail.

On April 17, 1974, Alcedo sued Sepe and PNB in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for collection and injunction with damages.

PNB alleged that it had no knowledge of the agreement between Mrs. Sepe and Alcedo to split the crop loan proceeds between them. It required Sepe to put up other collaterals when it granted her an additional loan because Alcedo informed the Bank that he was revoking the Special Power of Attorney he gave Sepe.

ISSUE:
Whether PNB validly foreclosed the real estate mortgage on Alcedo's property despite notice of Alcedo's revocation of the Special Power of Attorney authorizing Leticia Sepe to mortgage his property as security for her sugar crop loans


HELD:

No, PNB did not validly foreclosed the real estate mortgage on Alcedo’s property.

The Supreme Court held that since PNB had promised to exclude Alcedo's property as collateral for Sepe's 1971-72 sugar crop loan, it should have released the property to Alcedo. The mortgage which Sepe gave to the bank on Alcedo's lot as collateral for her 1971-72 sugar crop loan was null and void for having been already disauthorized by Alcedo. Since Alcedo's property secured only P13,100.00 of Sepe's 1970-71 sugar crop loan of P16,500.00 (because P3,400 was secured by Sepe's own property), Alcedo's property may be held to answer for only the unpaid balance, if any, of Sepe's 1970-71 loan, but not the 1971-72 crop loan.



While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the revocation of Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his property should appear in a public instrument nevertheless, a revocation embodied in a private writing is valid and binding between the parties

ESTATE OF RUIZ v. CA

ESTATE OF RUIZ v. CA

G.R. No. 118671; January 29, 1996

Ponente: J. Puno

FACTS:

The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. 
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.  

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. 

Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

ISSUE:
Whether the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren

HELD:

No, the probate has no authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren.


It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. 

Article 188 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.  The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. 

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.  It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

UNGAB-VALEROSO v. UNGAB-GRADO

UNGAB-VALEROSO v. UNGAB-GRADO

G.R. No. 163081; June 15, 2007

Ponente: J. Quisimbing

FACTS:

Petitioner Anita Ungab is the only child of Timoteo, now deceased. Respondent Felix Ungab is the brother of Timoteo while the other respondents are the heirs of Timoteo's other brothers and sisters, namely Simeona, Eugenia, Lorenzo, Lazaro, and Margarito. The subject of this case is a 14.3375-hectare land in Binuni, Kolambugan, Lanao (now Binuni, Bacolod, Lanao del Norte) registered in the name of Timoteo Ungab under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-41)-1,550.

In 1972, the heirs of Ciriaco Ungab filed a complaint against the brothers, sisters and heirs of Timoteo for the partition, accounting and reconveyance of the subject land. When the case was called for trial, the parties submitted a written compromise agreement.

On February 15, 1973, the CFI rendered judgment adopting in toto the compromise agreement.

The parties did not have the land partitioned but divided the proceeds of the land in accordance with the decision. However, in December 1996, Anita refused to give respondents their respective shares. Respondents then filed against petitioners Anita and her husband Ruselo Valeroso, a complaint for recovery of possession, partition, enforcement of compromise agreement and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the compromised agreement established an express trust


HELD:

Yes, the compromised agreement established an express trust.




The Supreme Court held that the execution of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment and the compromise agreement established an express trust wherein the respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner Anita and her mother, as trustees, that they will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. There are no particular words required in the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Express trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee repudiates the trust.